Police Krav Maga™ (Restricted)

This restricted course is available for law enforcement officers only.  The modules were filmed while providing training at the New Jersey State Police and Philadelphia Police Academies along with footage from the Marine Corps Center of Excellence (MACE) FBI training and the New Jersey Transit Counter-terror Training Center.  By design, the modules represented have overlap with many aspects of the Mastering Krav Maga civilian program.  Supplementing this training is the book Krav Maga Professional Tactics (YMAA 2016).

The Book of Psalms, chapter 144:1 

למלחמה׃ אצבעותי לקרבידי המלמד צורייהוה ברוך לדוד[

The Book of Psalms, chapter 144:1 

למלחמה׃ אצבעותי לקרבידי המלמד צורייהוה ברוך לדוד[

“A Psalm of David. Blessed be the LORD, my rock, Who trains my hands for war, And my fingers for battle.”

KRAV MAGA DEFENSIVE TACTICS SUMMARY

The krav maga defensive tactics are the Israeli National Police and Security Agencies’ official defensive tactics system.  Israeli krav maga defensive Tactics (IKM DT) emphasizes defending against any manner of unarmed and armed attacks, safeguarding personal weapons, UOF compliant arrest and control SOP, and performing other law enforcement and security-related measures.  The system provides for an all-important DT multiplier effect by establishing a few core tactics that can handle myriad threats.

IKM DT has received international acclaim from law enforcement and security professionals for its highly effective and practical defensive tactics training.  The krav maga system relies on instinctive body movements, which are easily learned, retained and performed under stress.  The tactics are based on building blocks that, that when combined, allow the officer to prevail in life-threatening situations.  IKM DT is now taught to LE agencies in more than two-dozen countries.

Perhaps, no other official defensive tactics system is more street-tested and proven.  IKM DT prepares law enforcement personnel with the mindset and physical skills to survive any onslaught.  Officers will learn how to react with speed, economy of motion, and the appropriate measure of force. 

As a non-lethal defensive tactics systems, IKM DT teaches officers never to respond with more force than necessary.  In a potential deadly force situation, however, such as an attack against an officer with an edged or blunt weapon or an attempt to take the officer’s firearm, the officer will learn to counterstrike instinctively and effectively using continuous defensive tactics motion in conjunction with highly effective control tactics to take command of the situation.

The philosophy behind krav maga differs greatly from other types of martial arts and self-defense systems.  Understanding the following philosophical pillars will help the officers to better absorb the training program – and reinforce why certain aspects of the training are needed to transfer the training methods to fellow officers.

These restricted access LE lessons were filmed at various IKM LE DT training courses.

IKM DT UOF OVERVIEW

The “objectively reasonable” UOF (use of force) standard was set by the Supreme Court case Graham v. Connor, 1989.  The Court advised the lower courts to ask three main questions regarding UOF:

1. What was the severity of the crime law enforcement believed the subject committed?
2. Did the subject present an immediate threat to law enforcement or the general public?
3. Did the subject resist arrest or attempt to escape?

Importantly, the Court also noted that circumstances are tense, uncertain, and rapidly changing.  Accordingly, LEOs may escalate and justify their level of force by choosing within their force options.  The Court also advised that the following factors are intrinsic in determining an objectively reasonable UOF:

• Totality of circumstances.  The objective reasonable UOF LEOs use will be judged on the “totality of circumstances” known by the officer at the time force was used.
• Intrusiveness. LEO UOF does not have to be the least intrusive option available.
• Objectivity.  Refers to what others would logically believe or conclude. Would a reasonably prudent and well-trained LEO who knows the law believe that what the officer did was acceptable?
• Moment of use.  A LEO’s use of force will be judged at the moment force is used.
• Myriad considerations underpin objectively reasonable UOF including:  circumstances, application of force, force options, training (or lack thereof), experience, department policy, AG guidelines and the constitutional standard set forward in Graham along with other relevant factors are taken into account when evaluating a use of force incident.

Additional UOF considerations:  roadway conditions, time of day, uniform restrictions, equipment, the number of officers present, the size + age + condition of both the officer and suspect, the duration of the action, previously known violent history of the suspect and/or drug + alcohol use, the presence of innocent bystanders, and can the suspect physically comply with the officer’s commands all play vital roles during in determining the objectively reasonable UOF.

• Generally, there is no objectively reasonable justification for LEOs to forcibly strike a suspect in the head (outside of deadly force encounter.)  Avoiding a head strike also helps to prevent a potentially dangerous exchange of body fluids.  If a physical distraction to the head is necessary, using an open-hand palm is far safer (protecting the LEO’s hand) and more justifiable for the officer than a closed fist.
• If the application of force is reasonable, the degree of injury sustained by a suspect/assailant is inconsequential
• Proactive approach → the law recognizes that if a LEO has a delayed or reactive response to an assault, the delay is unnecessary.
• Domino effect:  if reasonable UOF is not applied immediately to restrain & control, the incident’s circumstances may escalate endangering the officer, third parties, and the suspect (as a higher UOF may then be required). 
• Remember:  no duty to retreat, but, rather a duty to appropriately engage from a position of advantage.Until the subject submits to the LEO’s control, the application of force will not end, however, the UOF utilized must be objectively reasonable.
• Importantly, reacting against surprise attack (ambush) requires an instinctive reaction that must be articulated and analyzed in an UOF incident.  (i.e.  One does not initially have time to rationally or reasonably analyze the situation.)
• If a LEO’s actions constitute deadly force, all that matters is that the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable.  (Scott v. Harris, 2007)
• LEOs must realize and understand that during any UOF confrontation it is the subject who chooses to resist a LEO’s authority and control.  Accordingly, the subject determines when force will cease (by halting resistance and complying and/or becoming compliant when placed in restraints).  Note: This, especially when a subject is in restraints, is where many LEOs exceed the objectively reasonable UOF standard by failing to de-escalate and/or terminate their UOF exposing them/their agency to liability.
• To reemphasize, do not strike a restrained person; rather, use the restraints to apply pain-compliance methods.
• Each UOF incident is independent of another.  Each is a unique, independent set of circumstances.
• LEOs must also realize that good verbal communication skills, a well-written detailed report, good judgment, sound decisions, knowledge of the law, department policy, and proper documentation are all essential factors when assessing an UOF incident.
• LEOs must write a proper report articulating what they did and why they did with specificity.  Facts should be emphasized, not conclusions.  Importantly, when citing training and experience, state one’s DT training and relevant LEO experience(s.)

Pre-assault indicators (non-exclusive):

• Verbal aggression;
• Hands tighten/clenched fists;
• A change in posture and/or neck tightens or moves onto the balls of the feet or begins disrobing;
• Face becomes flush or pale;
• Excessive blinking;
• Lips separate baring teeth;
• Chin is tucked and/or eyebrows furrow and drop;
• Perspiration on the face;
• Individual ignores officer or looks past/away from the officer in preparation for an attack;
• Target glancing:  anatomy or officer’s weapons;
• Scanning for witnesses.

Priorities in reactionary gap:

1. Hands
2. Waistline
3. Demeanor
4. Lunging distance (less than 6 feet danger of closing reactionary gap)

Facts to Keep in Mind:

• 85% > of the population is right handed.  Watching both hands is important, but, emphasis should be placed on controlling the suspect’s right arm first.
• 92% of felons carry handgun in the middle of the torso.  (Source:  FLETC 2015)
• It takes a felon only 26/100ths of a second to deploy a weapon from his waistband (3x faster than the avg. officer can pull the trigger with a deployed, presented firearm.) (Source:  FLETC 2015)

Handcuffing considerations:

1. Place suspect in disadvantageous position facing away from officer: (“-5”) (i) with feet spread wide, bent at waist, hands towards the sky or (ii) kneeling, bent over, ankles crossed with officer’s foot controlling suspect’s top foot and hands to the sky.
2. Cuff as quickly as possible.
3. Proper wrist control (Cavalier #2) for placement and tightness.
4. Double lock after both bracelets attached & secure.

→ Think of how you, in a suspect’s position, would best counter your own cuffing tactics to preempt and thwart such an attempt.

2014 FBI Officer Assault Reporting Statistics:

Rate of officers assaulted was 9% per 100 officers

• 79.9% assaulted with hands, fists, & feet
• 4% assaulted with firearms
• 2% assaulted with knife
• 14.1% assaulted with other dangerous weapons

Rates involving specific types of violent incidents

• Handling/Transport of Prisoners – 18.3% (one officer) & 12.1% (two officers)
• Traffic Stops – 25.8% (one officer) & 20.5% (two officers)
• Disturbance Calls – 25.8% (one officer) & 17.7% (two officers)

Handling/Transport of Prisoners –

• 88.5% LE assaulted with personal weapons (hands, fist, & feet)
• 0.3% with FA
• 0.5% with knife
• 10.7% other dangerous weapon

Traffic Stops

• 59.3 LE assaulted with personal weapons
• 6.7% with firearm
• 0.8% with knife
• 33.1% other dangerous weapon

Disturbance Calls

• 83.7 LE assaulted with personal weapons
• 3.9% with FA
• 2.7% with knife
• 9.7% other dangerous weapon

FBI Reported State of NJ 2014 LE Assaulted – (total LE Assaulted 1,569):

• Firearms used against LE →19 LEOs
• Knife used against LE →15 LEOs
• Other Dangerous →128 LEOs
• Personal Weapons →1,407 LEOs